



INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PROGRAM
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

**INTR 290-015: INTELLIGENCE & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE &
THE PROTECTION OF DEMOCRACY**

Instructor: Dr. Frank Plantan

DESCRIPTION

The purpose of the course is for students to acquire the foundational tools necessary to think critically about counterintelligence. This should appeal to students of international relations, history, economics, and business as it will assess the past, current, and future role of counterintelligence in confronting threats to the nation's physical security and economic competitiveness.

This course will address the conceptual and practical issues in the practice of counterintelligence as it relates to the work of the intelligence community, national defense, economic competitiveness, and foreign policy decision-making. We will explore recurrent and prominent themes of intelligence failures, the trade-offs and calculations of a strong CI infrastructure as it relates to ethics, democracy and national power and prestige. We will examine numerous historical cases that shape our understanding of the subject. Students will gain an appreciation of how the intelligence function and counterintelligence required to protect a nation's secrets has been utilized by government, specifically: its structure, analytical processes, organizational culture, ethical issues that shape legal and policy constraints on the intelligence community. This class is, in essence, a primer on the diverse array of counterintelligence applications – within and beyond the government domain.

Readings will all be available by PDF but students are strongly encouraged to obtain a copy of John La Carre's Tinker, Tailor, Solder, Spy in connection with the CI fiction assignment.

There is a premium on working steadily through the readings because weekly topics and scheduling can change. Always be prepared to discuss the questions accompanying the reading assignments that night or at the beginning of the next class.

REQUIREMENTS

Requirements and weights for this course are as follows:

- **20%** - Intelligence fiction essay on BBC series, “Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy”
- **30 %**- Team case study using Structured Analytic Techniques. (length open-ended)
- **30%** - Final exam
- **20%** - Full participation (meaning: attendance, contributions, and field trip) in all classroom sessions, in-class exercises, engagement papers (5% each) and guest speaker questions and “after action reports.”

CALENDAR (NOTE: SPEAKERS LISTED WERE GUESTS IN 2017 AND MAY LIKELY CHANGE THIS YEAR)

DAY	DATE	TOPIC
1		Introduction: Goals and Purpose of Course <i>Why study counterintelligence?</i> Global Environment and US Foreign Policy
2		Machinery of the US Intelligence Community
3		Conceptual Framework: What is Intelligence and Counterintelligence? (Kent/Kendall “debate”)
4		Origins of American Counterintelligence: Begins with George Washington
5		Foreign Intelligence – “Defence of the Realm”: Evolution of CI in the United Kingdom (WWI; WWII; Cold War)
6		Transitions to the Modern Era of American Counterintelligence
7		Foreign Intelligence –Crystallization of Signals Intelligence: UKUSA and the “Special Relationship” (Cracking Enigma; Verona; precursor to Five Eyes)
8		Foreign Intelligence – The Great Game: Strategic Consequences of CI Failures and Successes (Soviet Union; KGB; Russia)
9		Tradecraft: Identify, Assess, Neutralize, Exploit- Part I

10	Tradecraft: Identify, Assess, Neutralize, Exploit— Part II
11	Cyber Threat –
12	Economic and Industrial Espionage
13	Interrogation & Torture/ Intelligence Interviewing ("Educing Information")
14	Democratic Oversight of Intelligence Agencies
15	A Dirty Business: Ethics and the Intelligence Function

1. INTRODUCTION: WHY STUDY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE?

OBJECTIVE

For our first meeting, we will discuss how and why this course came to be taught, its applied foci and various co-curricular, research, and career options available in the arena of national security intelligence.

READING

[Why Spy? : Espionage in an Age of Uncertainty, by Frederick P. Hitz \(former Inspector General of the CIA\), "Introduction," pp. 1 – 5.](#)

[The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. "Appendix C: Intelligence Primer," in Report to the President of the United States, pp. 579-589, March 31, 2005.](#) 

DISCUSSION

Why study counterintelligence?

1. Why is the field important?
2. What is the purpose, if any, of applying academic study to a secret craft?
3. In the final analysis, can intelligence studies be reduced as merely a form of crass empiricism?

2 GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT AND US FOREIGN POLICY

OBJECTIVE

The backdrop of this section is contemporary United States foreign policy and the traditions from which it stems. Against it, we identify the functions of the country's Intelligence Community (US IC) and enumerate various security threats and challenges in the domestic and international arenas.

READING

[National Intelligence Council. *Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds*. \(Washington: Government Printing Office, 2012\). 140 pp.](#)

**Read pp. i-xiv, 1-5, 7-35, 101-104.*

[Clapper, J. "Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence," Testimony, Legislative Hearing, 112th Cong., 2nd Sess. January 31, 2012. 30 pp.](#)

DISCUSSION

1. What challenges does the US IC face with the tide of globalization?
Together we will create a qualitative threat matrix.
2. Should the nation's intelligence services assume additional responsibilities so as to adequately contend with the diversity of today's threats?
3. Looking over the horizon, is there a threat to U.S. national security, U.S. citizens at home or abroad, or to U.S. businesses and national economic competitiveness that these reports may not have considered or may have understated?

3 MACHINERY OF THE US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

OBJECTIVE

Tonight we look at the machinery of the US Intelligence Community: the missions of, and relations between, its organs. This established, we take an additional step of understanding the role of counterintelligence plays in theory and practice.

READINGS

[US Intelligence Community Website](#)

**Carefully review the site*

[Hedley, John H., "The Evolution of Intelligence Analysis," in *Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations*, Roger Z. George & James B. Bruce, editors, Georgetown University Press, 2008, pp. 19 – 34.](#)

[The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. "Appendix C: Intelligence Primer," in *Report to the President of the United States*, pp. 579-589, March 31, 2005.](#)  

[Reagan, Ronald, "Executive Order 12333" in Rafalko, F. \(ed.\), *A Counterintelligence Reader: American Revolution into the New Millennium*, \(Washington: Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, 2004\), vol. 3, Chapter 3, pp. 219-231.](#)

DISCUSSION

1. Explain and assess the relationships shared between the nation's defense, intelligence, and counterintelligence missions--or doctrines, if you like--and actors.
2. Discern the roles and assess the efficacy of various actors intelligence and counterintelligence complex.

4 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: DEFINING "INTELLIGENCE" & "COUNTERINTELLIGENCE"

OBJECTIVE

Before moving further, we ought to survey the conceptual territory(ies) of "intelligence and "counterintelligence." Reviewing the definitional dialectic for both practices, this section will pay tribute to their subjective interpretations and--attempt to--forge agreement on what activities qualify as "intelligence" and "counterintelligence."

READINGS

[Warner, M. "Understanding Our Craft, Wanted: A Definition of 'Intelligence,'" *Studies in Intelligence*, 46:3, 2002.](#)  

[Redmond, P. "The Challenges of Counterintelligence," in *The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence*, Johnson, L. \(ed.\), pp. 537-554, \(New York: Oxford University Press, 2010\).](#)  

[Ehrman, J. "Toward a Theory of CI: What Are We Talking About When We Talk about Counterintelligence?" *Studies in Intelligence*, 53:2, 2009.](#)  

[Johnson, William, "What is Counterintelligence?" in Thwarting Enemies at Home and Abroad, William Johnson, pp. 1-3, \(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009\).](#)

DISCUSSION

1. Why is intelligence, and consequently counterintelligence, so hard to define?
2. Are intelligence / counterintelligence simply "catch-all" terms: thus reinforcing the nihilist thesis that intelligence studies is but crass empiricism?
3. Should intelligence studies be considered a sub-discipline of international relations or history? Or does the field emulsify these and other disciplines to merit disciplinary independence?

5. ORIGINS OF AMERICAN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

OBJECTIVE

Mythology dictates that America's practice of intelligence flowered only after World War II. Tonight, Dr. Plantan will advance a narrative that describes the nation's deep and rich tradition of intelligence / counterintelligence.

READING EXCERPTS FROM:

[Rafalko, F. \(ed.\), *A Counterintelligence Reader: American Revolution into the New Millennium*, \(Washington, D.C.: Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, 2004\), vols. 1-2.](#)  

DISCUSSION

1. Assess the role of US counterintelligence pre-1947 to the nation's security:
2. To what extent do you attribute the existence of counterintelligence to creation/preservation of the republic?
3. Using your preexistent knowledge, what traditions of American foreign policy--if any--do you think counterintelligence reinforced?

6: FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES - "DEFENCE OF THE REALM": EVOLUTION OF CI IN

GREAT BRITAIN

OBJECTIVE:

In class we will review in detail the evolution of Great Britain's intelligence services, paying particular attention to counterintelligence.

For your edification, in keeping with the central theme of "foreign intelligence services," you will read about intelligence as practiced in other countries. Additionally and broadly, two readings dissect the concept of "intelligence sharing" and its potential gains and risks.

READINGS:

Federation of American Scientists, Intelligence Resource Program: World Security and Intelligence Agencies.

At URL: <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/index.html>.

**Read about the services of eight (8) countries: two (2) from Europe, two (2) from Asia, two (2) from the Western Hemisphere, and two (2) from Africa.*

Herman, M. "Intelligence Cooperation," in *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*, pp. 200-218, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).  

DISCUSSION

1. What can be said of the various ways foreign states of utilize their intelligence communities?
2. To what extent are characteristics of nations embodied by these organs?
3. Identify three (3) dynamics that affect intelligence cooperation among states. Are these related or mutually exclusive?

6. TRANSITION TO THE MODERN ERA OF AMERICAN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

OBJECTIVE

This section will explore the dynamics that influenced the evolution of America's modern counterintelligence machinery.

READING

Millennium, (Washington: Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, 2004), Vol. 3, Chapter 1, pp. 20 – 37; 47-48; 55-57; 66-68.

DISCUSSION

1. Consider the following for US counterintelligence between 1947 to present:
 1. What has been its role in protecting American fulfillment of national security doctrine?
 2. Has the specter of the threats to American national security decreased, increased, or remained--for the most part--the same. Are the nation's citizenry, policymakers, and elected officials in general agreement of this?

3. Think about the relationship between the nation's democracy and execution counterintelligence. In what respects is this relationship mutually beneficial and / or harmful to mission efficacy and / or democracy?

READINGS

Clift, A.D. "The Evolution of International Collaboration in the Global Intelligence Era," in *The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence*, Johnson, L. (ed.), pp. 212-225, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).  

Lander, S. "International Intelligence Cooperation: An Inside Perspective," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 17:3 (2004), pp. 481-493.  

DISCUSSION

1. Considering the interests of counterintelligence, do you think it is to the advantage of the United States to be as devoted to UKUSA in 21st century as it was in the 20th?
2. Does collective intelligence gathering necessitate total knowledge of your partner's security policies?
3. When for a state does it make sense to share classified information for a shared intelligence mission with other states / transnational entities.
4. Imagine a foreign national leveraging bona fides from a friendly country has penetrated the intelligence service you are tasked with performing counterintelligence for. Upon this individual's capture, how much are you willing to share about this person with his / her parent country's security services?

7 FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE - SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE: UKUSA & THE "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP"

OBJECTIVE

This session will cover the practice of signals intelligence; namely the ways in which it stands apart from intelligence practices.

8. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE – THE GREAT GAME: STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES OF CI

FAILURES AND SUCCESS

OBJECTIVE

Prima facie, intelligence sharing is in large measure mutually beneficial for participating states. Yet as demonstrated at various points in the UKUSA arrangement, internal social and governance difficulties have a tendency to calcify, ultimately becoming wedges against harmonious pursuit of common foreign policy goals. Adversaries change, develop new strategies and methods of penetration and we learn that advances in CI often follow embarrassing and costly intelligence and CI failures.

READINGS

Aldrich, R.J. "Dangerous Liaisons: Post September 11 Intelligence Alliances," *Harvard International Review*, 24:3 (2002), pp. 50-54.  

Jeffreys-Jones, R. "A Gift from America: Government in the Sunshine," in *In Spies We Trust: The Story of Western Intelligence*, pp. 152-172, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).  

Sims, J.E. "Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals, and Details," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 19:2 (2006), pp. 195-217.  

DISCUSSION

1. How do you explain the Cambridge Five's ability to penetrate British intelligence? Realistically, could this have been prevented?
2. Capping this extended look into foreign intelligence partnership and the UK respectively, to what degree should a partnership between the US and UK exist in today's climate? In what ways can both states overcome internal, relationship, and theoretical difficulties, or are they forever consigned to ask of each other, "wherefore art thou?"
3. Too often intelligence and CI focus on a single or primary adversary; yet the most nations of the world have some form of intelligence or security agency. How are we to prioritize the allocation of resources when the CI spectrum of threat can run from the extreme confrontation with the former Soviet Union and the KGB to dealing with "Frenemies" like France? How often have intelligence coups been missed because the source was suspected of being a double agent?

9. TRADECRAFT: IDENTIFY, ASSESS, NEUTRALIZE, EXPLOIT AND THE INSIDER THREAT

OBJECTIVES

Tonight is a brief primer on the various aspects of counterintelligence tradecraft, reducible to the stages of: identification, assessment, neutralization, and-- possible--exploitation. We will then consider if these techniques align with counterintelligence theory and national policy.

READING

Cram, C.C. "Of Moles and Molehunters," *Studies in Intelligence* 38:5 (1995), pp. 129-137.  

Olson, J.M. "A Never Ending Necessity: The Ten Commandments of CI," *Studies in Intelligence*, Fall-Winter (2001), pp. 81-87.  

[Kalugin, Oleg, "Prologue," and "The Spy Game" in Spymaster: My Thirty-two Years in Intelligence and Espionage Against the West," pp. vii-xiv; 167-270 \(NY: Basic Books, 2009\)](#)

O'Brien, K.A. "Managing National Security and Law Enforcement Intelligence in a Globalised World," *Review of International Studies*, 35:4, 2009: pp. 903-915.

DISCUSSION

1. Is it possible, or if so wise, to profile against the "insider threat."
2. Considering Herbig's argument, how far do you accept the presence of different "waves" of motivations in history? Looking at today's cases.
3. Connect counterintelligence methods with intelligence theory and strategy. Considering implementation, at what points does counterintelligence embolden, enhance, and / or harm the cycle of positive intelligence acquisition?

10. CYBER THREAT

OBJECTIVE

An overview of the threat posed to American national security by cyberwarfare.

READING

PART I

Clift, A.D. "From Semaphore to Predator: Intelligence in the Internet Era," *Studies in Intelligence*, 47:3 (2003), pp. 73-79.  

Nye, J. S. "Cyber Power," Paper, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, May 2010, 30 pp  .

Warner, M. "Cybersecurity: A Pre-History," *Intelligence and National Security*, 27:5 (2012), pp. 781-799.  .

DISCUSSION

1. "Cyberwar?" What's the big deal? How is "cyber" different from past technology breakthroughs?
2. In what ways does the cyber threat complicate systemic adherence to an efficient intelligence cycle? What are the implications of this to intelligence doctrine design and efficacy?
3. The above question considered, in what area(s) of cyber defense should counterintelligence doctrine concentrate attention and resources?

11 ECONOMIC & INDUSTRIAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

OBJECTIVE

An overview of the threat posed by economic and industrial espionage.

READING

PART I

Johnson, L. "Stock and (James) Bonds: Spies in the Global Marketplace," in *Bombs, Bugs, Drugs, and Thugs: Intelligence and America's Quest for Security*, pp. 32-50 (New York: New York University Press).  .

Wright, J. "Intelligence and Economic Security," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 5:2 (1991), pp. 203-221.  .

PART II

Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, United States Government. *Security Counterintelligence, Spies Stealing Economic Secrets in Cyberspace: Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage, 2009-2011* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2011). 32 pp.  .

DISCUSSION

1. At what point, if any, should the government devote resources to protecting industry secrets. Conversely, at what point should it pull back?
2. Should US intelligence involve itself in conducting *offensive* counterintelligence operations for the benefit of the private sector?

3. What mechanisms can be implemented for the purpose of better coordinating defensive efforts from the public and private sectors against cyber espionage?

12. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: OVERSIGHT,

OBJECTIVE

No branch of government, at least in recent history, has possessed ability to unilaterally dictate American foreign policy and domestic security like that of the executive. Tonight, we explore the effects of this on democratic accountability of America's Intelligence Community, and by consequence, its counterintelligence function.

READING

[Andrew, C. "American Presidents and Their Intelligence Communities," *Intelligence and National Security*, 10:4 \(1995\), pp. 95-112.](#)

[Johnson, L. "The CIA and the Question of Accountability," *Intelligence and National Security*, 12:1 \(1997\), pp. 178-200.](#)  

[Knott, S. "Executive Power and the control of American Intelligence," *Intelligence and National Security*, 13:2, 171-176.](#)  

DISCUSSION

1. As far as a president and other policymakers are concerned, is there a significant difference between the practices of intelligence / counterintelligence that could affect policy? Or is this an arcane distinction observed only by intelligence professionals?
2. Identify three (3) trends shared by all presidents in the 20th century in their use of counterintelligence.

13 INTEL CULTURE AND STRUCTURED ANALYTIC TECHNIQUES

OBJECTIVE

Paul Johnson, Director of the Center for the Study of Intelligence has noted, "The assertion that war is too serious a matter to be left to military men is generally ascribed to France's premier during WWI, Georges Clemenceau. I have heard it said only I jest that intelligence is too serious a matter to be left to the intelligence professionals." Tonight we will look into the analytic culture of the intelligence community and the psychology of intelligence analysis and how it affects the efficacy and efficiency and impact of the IC's product.

READING

[Heuer, Richards J. Jr., Chapter 5, "Do You Really Need More Information?" and Chapter 6, "Keeping an Open Mind," pp. 51- 84 in *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis* \(Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999\)](#)

[Heuer, Richards j., & Randolph H. Pherson, excerpts, pp. 3-10; 20-35; 147-172 in *Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis*, \(Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2011\).](#)

14 Counterintelligence and American Democracy - Intel Culture

Objective

In considering the relationship between secret intelligence and American democracy, perhaps of equal importance to the Intelligence Community's relationship with respective branches of government in full view is a closer look at the various cultures that comprise the IC. What can be said about these--their characteristics, innate tendencies, and consequent behavior insofar as operational and analytic performance?

Reading

[Johnson, L.K. "A Conversation with James R. Clapper, Jr., The Director of National Intelligence in the United States," *Intelligence and National Security*, 30:1 \(2014\), pp. 1-25.](#)

15. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY – ETHICS, INTERROGATION AND TORTURE

Objective

A recurring topic in the national dialogue, "enhanced interrogation" elicits to the fore opinions (both visceral and well-thought) on how to balance national security methods with the ethics of a democratic society. Tonight, we explore the debate and think critically about its significance -- to American counterintelligence, security, and society at large.

READING

[Herman, M. "Ethics and Intelligence after September 2001." *Intelligence and National Security*, 19:2 \(2010\), pp. 342-358.](#)

[United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. "Foreword" and Findings and Conclusions," in *Committee Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program* \(December, 2014\), pp. 1-26.](#)

[Hubbard, K.M. "Psychologists and Interrogations: What's Torture Got to Do with It?" *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy*, 7:1 \(2007\), pp. 29-33](#)

Discussion

1. Are "enhanced interrogation methods" a form of "torture"?
 2. In either case, do they help or hinder American national security? In formulating your argument, consider specific examples (in lieu of over-generalizations).
 3. Herman writes that in a post-Cold War era, "Intelligence could be seen no longer as primarily an element in states' competition with others, but as a means of co-operation for shared objectives against common targets: a legitimized activity, with some recognized international standards similar to those of other professions, such as law enforcement" (Herman, 2010, p. 355). He also observes, "Nothing is prohibited for intelligence by the laws of war, except the torture of prisoners" (p. 344). If "enhanced interrogation methods" amount to a form of torture, what does this portend for the viability of Herman's "new intelligence paradigm"?
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16. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY – CI AND THE FIFTH ESTATE-

OBJECTIVE

Government transparency and access to information are essential ingredients for a democratic society. However, in select instances, information must be withheld for its survival. And so for a democracy to survive, ironically, it must also rely on secrecy. In considering the relationship between secret intelligence and American democracy, perhaps of equal importance to the Intelligence Community's relationship with respective branches of government in full view is a closer look at the various cultures that comprise the IC. What can be said about these--their characteristics, innate tendencies, and consequent behavior insofar as operational and analytic performance? This session will examine this defining characteristic of American intelligence, and the mutual benefit and / or harm posed to both its liberal society and intelligence organs.

READING

[Ransom, H.H. "Secret Intelligence in the United States, 1947-1982: The CIA's Search for Legitimacy," in Andrew and Dilks, eds., pp. 199-226., \(Urbana Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1984\).](#)  

FINAL CRITIQUE AND DEBATE